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Abstract
The type of scale used to represent the attributes of decision alternatives has
received little attention in previous research, despite the pervasive presence of this issue
in decision making. In two process tracing experiments we investigated how the type
of scale used affects choices and choice processes. We hypothesized that scales affect
the ease of accomplishing various component processes in choice. Experiment 1 used
scales that differed in two ways: (1) whether all attributes were on the same scale (i.e.,
commonality) and (2) whether the scales were in units that were meaningful in the
problem domain (i.e., context-relevance). We also manipulated economic incentives to
favor speed over accuracy or the converse. Participants made more accurate decisions
with common, context-independent scales but faster decisions with context-relevant
scales. In addition, choice processes mediated the effects of scaling on both speed and
accuracy. Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1 with decision contexts
that differed in familiarity. Both experiments demonstrate that the scales used to
present attributes can influence both the speed and accuracy of decision making,
despite the presence of explicit economic incentives. Designers of choice studies and
information displays are therefore advised to exercise care in choosing attribute scales.

Introduction
Both common sense and normative theories of choice suggest that our decisions
should not change because of minor variations in the way a problem is described or
formulated. Yet the failure of this principle of description invariance (Tversky, Sattath,
and Slovic, 1988) to hold across different representations of the same problem has been
a consistent theme in behavioral decision research (see Payne, Bettman, and Johnson,
1992). One of main ideas that has emerged from this research is that judgments and
choices are not merely revealed in decision making, but are instead actively constructed
(Slovic, Griffin, and Tversky, 1990). If a decision makers' reported preferences are
indeed constructed in response to a specific stimulus, they could well be susceptible to
the influence of idiosyncrasies of the particular problem representation, such as the way
information is displayed.
One basic aspect of information display that has received little attention in previous
decision research is the type of scale used to represent the attributes of alternatives. For
example, in practice, magazines evaluating computer hardware and software
sometimes describe attributes using tangible units (e.g., dollars, number of bytes of
memory), and other times using abstract ratings (e.g., quality on a 1 to 4 scale where 4 is
excellent, 3 is good, etc.). Presentations of scales that include combinations of tangible
units and abstract ratings are found in evaluations of consumer products (e.g.,
Consumer Re-ports magazine), personal computers (e.g., ComputerWorld and PCWorld
magazines), wines (Wine Spectator, November 15, 1992), the nutritive content of food
(e.g., Cawley and Arndt, 1992), colleges (e.g., compare Barron's Profiles ofAmerican
Colleges (College Division of Barron's Educational Series, 1990) and The Fiske Guide to
Colleges (Fiske, 1990)), and even the effectiveness of environmental action groups
(Gifford and the editors of Outside magazine, 1990). In addition to the theoretical
question of whether variations in scaling lead to violations of the principle of
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description invariance, there is also an important practical question faced by advertisers
and designers of information displays -- how to accomplish particular objectives (e.g.,
increasing sales) by choosing appropriate scales for use by decision makers.
There are also differences in the scales used in empirical research on decision
making that mirror those found in practice. For example, in studies of multiartribute
choice many researchers have used scales that are tangible and relate to the decision
context (e.g., Bettman and Kakkar, 1977; Bettman and Park, 1980; Payne, 1976; Russo
and Dosher, 1983), while others have used rating scales that are independent of context
(e.g., Creyer, Bettman, and Payne, 1990; Schkade and Kleinmuntz, in press; Stone and
Schkade, 1991). Despite the pervasive presence of scaling in decision problems, and
research demonstrating that decision behavior varies systematically with other aspects
of information display (see Kleinmuntz and Schkade, in press), the type of scale used to
represent the attributes of decision alternatives has received little attention. Without
research investigating the consequences of differing attribute scales, even careful
designers and users of decision research and information displays are left without
guidance as to whether scaling matters and, if it does, specifically how it affects decision
making. In this paper we investigate the theoretical question of whether variations in
scaling lead to violations of the principle of description invariance and the practical
question of how to accomplish particular objectives by choosing appropriate scales for
use by decision makers. We argue that scaling does indeed affect decision making and
report the results of two process tracing experiments that investigate the effects of using
different scales to represent the same sets of alternatives.
How Scaling Affects Choice Processes
There is scattered evidence that some characteristics of individual attribute scales
can affect decision making. For example, Johnson, Payne, and Bettman (1988) found
that, , decision makers made intransitive choices more frequently with probabilities
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represented as complicated fractions than as simple decimals. Other studies have
found that using words rather than numbers to represent attribute values in
multiattribute choice can influence decision processes (Huber, 1980; Schkade and
Kleinmuntz, in press; Stone and Schkade, 1991). A few studies have also found that
attributes with larger ranges, larger variances, or more scale levels sometimes have
greater influence on assessed preference functions (Beattie and Baron, 1991; Reibstein,
Bateson, and Boulding, 1988; Witkin, Krishnamurthi, and Nutter, 1982). Finally, Slovic
and MacPhillamy (1974) found that attributes that were common to all alternatives
received greater weight than those that were not. While this research suggests that the
characteristics of individual attribute scales can affect decision making under some
conditions, decision makers must often assess and integrate information on multiple
attributes. Research that explains how decision making is affected by the relationship
among attribute scales, as well as the attributes of individual scales, could therefore
provide important insights to designers of choice studies and other displays of
multiattribute information.
Why might attribute scaling affect choice processes? Decision behavior is known to
be highly sensitive to many other features of the task environment (Einhorn and
Hogarth, 1981; Payne, 1982). There is a growing body of empirical evidence that this
sensitivity results from decision makers choosing heuristic strategies that reduce
cognitive demands relative to other possible strategies (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson,
1993). One view of this process suggests that decision makers choose a strategy based
primarily on its anticipated effort and accuracy (Johnson and Payne, 1985).
A major activity of multiattribute decision making is integrating information about
an alternative's various attributes to form an overall evaluation. The extent to which
scaling facilitates comparisons or combinations across attributes may therefore affect
decision processes (Slovic and MacPhillamy, 1974). Greater difficulty of comparing or
combining the values of different attributes could lead to lower decision quality if (1)
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decision makers make more execution errors while attempting to use normatively
correct strategies (which generally require many interattribute operations), or (2)
decision makers shift to less effortful (but suboptimal) heuristic strategies that require
fewer interattribute operations. For example, computing a weighted linear combination
of the attribute values (as required by some normative strategies) involves the
simultaneous combination of all of an alternative's attribute values. A decision maker
attempting to use this strategy with a different scale for each attribute might well make
errors in translation from one scale to another, or resort to approximations to reduce the
cognitive difficulty of the task (cf. Russo and Dosher, 1983). In contrast, many heuristic
strategies avoid this problem. For example, the elimination by aspects strategy
(Tversky, 1972) requires no interattribute operations, and thus no difficult translations
from one scale to another. However, it also does not always pick the optimal
alternative.
Effects of Attribute Scales
Previous studies of multiattribute choice have employed many different types of
scales. Most studies fall into one of two categories: those using each attribute's "natural"
scale (e.g., Bettman and Park, 1980; Bettman and Zins, 1979; Payne, 1976), and those
using the same rating scale for all attributes (e.g., Jarvenpaa, 1989). Two dimensions
that underlie the differences between these scales are commonality and context-
relevance. Commonality of scales is the extent to which the same scale is used to
represent multiple attributes. For example, with common scales rent, proximity to
work, and size might all be expressed in dollars, or utils, or on the same rating scale.
With the other extreme, unique scales, each attribute is represented on a different scale.
Context-relevance is the extent to which scales use units that are meaningful in the
domain of the decision. For example, context-relevant scales might represent an
apartment's rent in dollars, proximity to work in minutes, size in square feet, and so on.
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In contrast, context-independent scales express units on an abstract scale that is not
associated with a particular problem domain. For example, context-independent scales
might employ rating scales such as 0-10 or 1-5, where larger numbers are better.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the two extremes of the commonality and context-
relevance dimensions of scaling (Morochove, 1992). Both figures are evaluations of
accounting software packages from PCWorld, a publication that evaluates
microcomputer hardware and software. Figure 1 illustrates unique, context-relevant
scaling. Information about the price of the software is stated in dollars, the extent of
daily telephone support in hours, and the maximum number of ledger accounts, fiscal
periods, and departments in the actual number of units permitted by the software.
Figure 2 illustrates common, context-independent scaling. It presents information
about the same attributes as Figure 1 using the same 1 to 4 scale, where 4 is excellent, 3
is good, etc.
Insert Figures 1 & 2 about here
How might the commonality of scales affect decision making? Presenting attributes
on a common scale should make interattribute operations easier than when attributes
are on unique scales. Previous research provides some support for this reasoning.
Stone and Schkade (1991) and Schkade and Kleinmuntz (in press) used common scales
and found high levels of within-alternative processing. Conversely, the results of many
studies using unique scales found greater use of within-attribute than within-alternative
processing (e.g., Bettman and Park, 1980; Capon and Burke, 1980; Payne, 1976; Russo
and Dosher, 1983), although some have found about equal amounts of each type (e.g.,
Bettman and Kakkar, 1977; Billings and Scherer, 1988; Jacoby, Chestnut, and Fisher,
1978; Johnson and Meyer, 1984). The ease of performing within-alternative operations
with common scales should encourage the use of strategies that require them. Because
normative strategies, such as the weighted additive, usually rely upon within-
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alternative operations (Russo and Dosher, 1983) then common scales may increase
choice quality by making it easier to use these strategies. However, common scaling
generally requires presenting attributes in standardized, abstract units that are different
from their "natural" scales, which could cause confusion or make the attribute values
difficult to relate to the decision maker's existing knowledge. Thus, it is not obvious a
priori that commonality of scales is unambiguously good.
How might the context-relevance of scales affect decision making? Context-relevant
scales may facilitate the use of decision maker's existing knowledge about the task
domain. Previous experiences are more likely to be stored in memory in relevant units
than on abstract scales. As a result, accessing knowledge stored in memory with
context-independent scales may require additional translation steps to keep track of the
correspondence between the abstract and context-relevant units. For example, suppose
you are choosing a new car and would like to compare the characteristics of new cars to
those you have owned in the past. Unfortunately, you are looking at a magazine that
only states that a given car is "good" on gas mileage, "average" on engine capacity,
"low" on price and so forth. To make a comparison to your previous cars, whose gas
mileage you know in miles per gallon, engine capacity in horsepower, and price in
dollars, you have to keep track of the end-points of the magazine's scale, whether the
criteria for "good" gas mileage have changed since the last time you bought a car, and
a variety of other mental bookkeeping tasks. Wouldn't it be much easier to make
comparisons with previously owned cars if the new cars' attributes were given in their
natural units?
Context-relevant scales are therefore likely to speed the execution of strategies by
facilitating comparisons of new with familiar information. At the same time, context-
relevant scaling may not improve decision accuracy, since task familiarity often
produces no effect on decision quality in structured tasks (Armstrong, 1978; Dawes,
1971; Goldberg, 1970), or even negative effects in some situations (Adelson, 1984; Stone
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and Dilla, 1992). We therefore expect faster but not necessarily more accurate decisions
with context-relevant scales than with context-independent scales.
Incentives for Speed and Accuracy
Some authors (e.g., Creyer, Bettman, and Payne, 1990; Ford, Schmitt,
Schechtman, Hults and Doherty, 1989) argue that the lack of explicit goals in some
studies of choice leaves doubt as to the objectives of research participants.
Systematically varying the incentives offered for alternative aspects of processing and
performance controls for differences in participants' goals and helps ensure that results
are not driven by general preferences for particular aspects of processing or
performance. For example, Kleinmuntz and Schkade (in press) and Payne et al. (1993)
argue that effort may be the most important consideration when selecting a choice
strategy. However, it may also be the case that effort-related goals dominate only in the
absence of explicit performance goals. Providing incentives can therefore be
conceptualized as inducing a meta-utility function that explicitly defines the costs and
benefits associated with particular dimensions of decision strategies.
We included explicit incentives favoring speed or accuracy to address these
concerns. There is evidence that subjects can adapt their speed and accuracy to task
demands in simple cognitive tasks such as visual search and pattern recognition (e.g.,
Dosher, 1984; Pashler, 1989; Reed, 1973; Vernon, 1987) and simple psycho-motor tasks
such as typing and editing (e.g., Card, Moran, and Newell, 1983). However, research
investigating speed-accuracy tradeoffs in more complex tasks such as multiattribute
choice is more limited, especially in the presence of explicit incentives.
Evidence suggests that the effects of explicit incentives are complex and task
dependent (Hogarth, Gibbs, McKenzie, and Marquis, 1991). One common finding in
structured tasks is that participants try harder when given explicit incentives.
However, in complex tasks additional effort does not necessarily improve performance
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(Hogarth et al., 1991; Sujan, 1986), since it is possible to work harder at implementing a
flawed decision strategy (Arkes, Dawes, and Christensen, 1986). Since accuracy in
multiattribute choice requires both effort and an appropriate decision strategy, it may
be that incentives for speed (i.e., for reducing effort) may result in faster decisions but
incentives for accuracy may not produce better decisions.
To summarize, we hypothesize that the commonality of scales primarily affects
decision accuracy, while the context-relevance of scales primarily affects decision speed.
We hypothesize that these effects occur because attribute scaling influences the
anticipated effort of various component processes of choice. As a result, decision
makers will (1) use more alternative-oriented processing and therefore make better
decisions with common than with unique scales, and (2) make faster but not better
decisions with context-relevant than with context-independent scales. In addition, we
hypothesize that explicit incentives favoring speed will result in faster decisions but that
incentives favoring accuracy will not result in better decisions. We now turn to two
experiments designed to test these hypotheses.
Experiment 1
In this first experiment we examine whether scaling has any effect on choices and
choice processes. We use three basic types of scales for attributes in multiattribute
choice problems: common, context-independent (CCI), unique, context-independent
(UCI), and unique context-relevant (UCR). 1 These scales are constructed such that the
UCI scaling differs from the CCI in commonality and from the UCR in context-
relevance. Our objective is to determine the effect on choice processes of using different
scaling options for the same underlying alternatives. In addition, we provide
participants with explicit economic incentives for the speed and accuracy of their
choices.
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Method
Task. Participants were instructed to choose the best word processing package for
use by a hypothetical management consulting firm from sets of 8 alternatives described
on 6 attributes. Alternatives were displayed on one dimension of a matrix and
attributes on the other. The six attributes presented in all choices were chosen based on
criteria used in professional practice to evaluate word processing software (American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1984; DataPro Reports, 1990). The chosen
attributes were the number of critical text processing features, cost in dollars, ease of
use measured in number of keystrokes for a set of standard tasks, average wait time in
seconds for a set of standard tasks, time in hours to learn twenty basic functions, and
number of printers to be replaced due to incompatibility with the software. We selected
software choice as the problem domain since practicing information system
professionals make extensive use of multiattribute choice displays in hardware and
software selection decisions (O'Brien, 1990; Stair, 1992).
Participants were provided with the "optimal" attribute weights using the following
instructions:
"Harold Gregory believes that, while all of the above factors are relevant in
making the decision, some factors are more important than others.
Specifically, factors one and two are three times as important as factors five
and six, while factors three and four are twice as important as factors five and
six."
This weighting scheme defined a rank ordering of quality for alternatives in each choice
set. Choice accuracy was defined as the rank order within the set of the chosen
alternative. The attribute weights were determined based upon the average attribute
importance rankings of six practicing information systems professionals who analyzed
the experimental case.
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Incentives. We implemented economic incentives for speed and accuracy by
adapting a lottery approach designed to induce linear utility functions (Berg, Daley,
Dickhaut, and O'Brien, 1986). Participants earned lottery tickets based upon task
performance for chances to win 1 of 10 $20 prizes. Lotteries were actually played and
the winners paid. Our incentive scheme was similar to that of Creyer et al. (1990).
Participants were informed that their compensation for the experiment depended on
both speed and accuracy. To implement this scheme, we converted both the range of
decision times and possible accuracy outcomes into 8 point scales. If the best alternative
was selected the accuracy score was 8, if the second best was selected the accuracy score
was 7, and so forth. For decision time we used pretesting to determine the distribution
of possible decision times. This range was split into 8 equal segments. If the choice was
made in the first eighth of the range of times, the speed score was 8, if the choice was
made in the second eighth of the range of times the speed score was 7, and so forth.
Participants in the "accuracy > speed" condition earned lottery tickets based primarily
upon choice accuracy, and were given these instructions about their incentives:
"You can earn tickets for the lottery based upon two factors:
(1) Quality of software choices. Each software package you will consider has a
quality rating that ranges from 8 (best) to 1 (worst). This rating is based on Harold
Gregory's judgment of the relative importance of the six factors. You will be
evaluated based on how accurately you follow Harold Gregory's guidelines.
(2) Time rating for choices. The amount of time you use to choose software will be
compared with previous participants and rated on a 1 to 8 scale. Making a choice in
less than 30 seconds is considered excellent (an 8 rating). Making a choice in 5
minutes or more is considered very poor (a 1 rating).
The number of tickets you earn for the lottery will be determined by the following
formula:
Number of tickets = (3 X average choice quality) + (1 X average time rating).
Choice quality is therefore three times as important as time rating in earning tickets
for the lottery. You can earn a maximum of 32 tickets (3X8 + 1X8) and a minimum
of 4 tickets (3X1 + 1X1)."
Attribute Scales and Choice
11
Participants in the "speed > accuracy" condition received similar instructions, except
that time rating was described three times as important as choice quality.
Stimuli. Attributes were represented using one of three types of scales (see Table 1).
In the UCR condition each attribute was represented on a different scale, which was
meaningful in the problem domain. In the CCI condition all attributes were
represented on the same ten point abstract scale. In the UCI condition each attribute
was represented on a different abstract scale. The values for the attribute levels of the
underlying alternatives were constructed using the common, context-independent
scales and then converted systematically to the other two types of scales. Thus, the
alternatives that composed a given choice problem in different scale conditions were
conceptually identical, that is, the scale values had an exact correspondence to the same
set of underlying attribute values. 2
Insert Table 1 about here
Design. The design was a 3 (scaling) X 2 (incentives) factorial in which participants
were randomly assigned to conditions. All manipulations were between-participants.
Each participant made 1 practice and 12 actual choices, which differed in the
composition of the alternatives in a choice set but had the same format. Results were
analyzed using a repeated measures MANOVA, with scale and incentive conditions as
between-participant factors. The order of choice sets, and of alternatives within a choice
set, was counterbalanced between participants using a fractional factorial design.
Procedure. Two hundred and ten undergraduate students participated for class
credit and the chance to win 1 of 10 $20 prizes in a lottery. Participants were run in
groups of 12 to 17. Each session took about 60 minutes to complete. The Mouselab
decision research software (Johnson, Payne, Schkade, and Bettman, 1988) was used to
display the choice problems in a matrix format and to collect data.
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Using Mouselab, when a choice set first appears on the screen, the information
about the alternatives is "hidden" in labeled boxes. These boxes can be "opened" to
reveal their contents by using the mouse to move the cursor into a given box. Only one
box can be open at a time. Participants make choices by moving the cursor to the choice
box of the desired alternative, and clicking a mouse button. Figure 3 illustrates an
experimental display from the UCR condition after a cell has been "opened." In Figure
3, the "processing" (i.e., number of critical text processing features) attribute cell of
alternative C is "open" and indicates that alternative C has a value of 10 (the highest
possible) on this attribute. Mouselab records the sequence of cells opened, the time
spent in each cell, and the choice made by a participant.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Dependent Variables. Decision accuracy was measured as the average rank of the
alternatives chosen by a participant across the twelve trials. Several measures of
decision strategy were used: (1) the time required to make a choice, (2) the information
search pattern, (3) the variability of information searched by attributes and by
alternatives, and (4) the percentage of time spent on the two most important attributes,
the two middle importance attributes, and the two least important attributes. The
search pattern was evaluated using a direction of search index (Payne, 1976), which
measures the extent of within-alternative and within-attribute processing. If the (n +
l)th piece of information searched is within the same alternative as the nth (i.e., a
within-alternative or interattribute transition), the statistic moves toward +1. If the (n +
l)th piece of information searched is within the same attribute (i.e., a within-attribute or
interalternative transition), the statistic moves toward -1. A positive number indicates
more alternative- than attribute-based processing, while a negative number indicates
more attribute- than alternative-based processing. The index is computed as:
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(Total within-alternative transitions - Total within-attribute transitions)
Search Index =
(Total within-alternative transitions + Total within-attribute transitions)
Two measures of the variability of information searched were adapted from
prior research (Klayman, 1983; Payne, 1976): (1) variability in the time spent per
alternative, and (2) variability in the time spent per attribute. The variability in time
spent per alternative (attribute) measures the extent to which decision time is focused
on a few alternatives (attributes) versus spread across all alternatives (attributes). It is
measured as the standard deviation of the time spent per alternative (attribute) across
the set of attributes (alternatives).
Debriefing Questions. After the experiment, participants responded to a series of
questions that included the perceived difficulty of making choices ("I found it difficult
to make word processing choices.") on 1 to 7 scales, where 1 was "Definitely not" and 7
was "Definitely yes."
Results
Effects of Scaling. As predicted, scaling had significant effects on both the speed and
accuracy of choices (see Table 2). Participants made the fastest choices with unique
context-relevant (UCR) scales, the most accurate choices with common, context-
independent (CCI) scales, and were least successful on both dimensions with unique,
context-independent (UCI) scales. Information search was more alternative-oriented
with CCI than with UCI scales and more attribute-oriented with UCR than UCI scales.
Consistent with our hypotheses, decisions were more accurate with CCI than UCI
scales but were faster with UCR than UCI scales. Our results therefore support our
contention that the commonality of scales primarily affects decision accuracy, while
context-relevance primarily affects decision speed.3
Insert Table 2 about here
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The faster decision time and strongly attribute-based search found in the UCR
condition suggest greater use of attribute-based, noncompensatory strategies such as
elimination-by-aspects by UCR participants. Other results also support this
interpretation. UCR participants spent more time examining information on the two
most important attributes (F(2, 204) = 5.1, p = .01) and less time on the two attributes of
moderate importance (F(2, 204) = 6.8, p < .01) than UCI or CCI participants. UCR
participants also had higher variability in time spent per attribute than UCI participants
(F(2, 204) = 5.8, p < .01). However, there were no differences in the variability in time
spent per alternative (F(2, 204) = 0.6, p = .55) or the perceived difficulty of making
choices (F(2, 204) = 1.9, p = .15) due to scaling.
Effects ofIncentives. As predicted, incentives had a significant effect on speed, but
not accuracy (see Table 3). Participants given incentives favoring speed spent 18% less
time making their choices than participants given incentives favoring accuracy.
However, while participants with an accuracy incentive spent more time making
choices, their accuracy did not improve. Consequently, participants with incentives for
speed earned more lottery tickets (see Table 3) and perceived the task as easier (F(2, 204)
= 8.2, p < .01). However, the effect of incentives on the number of lottery tickets earned
is moderated by a scaling by incentives interaction (F(2, 204) = 7.8, p < .01) (see Figure
4). With CCI scales, participants earned approximately the same number of lottery
tickets regardless of incentives (Tukey HSD test, p > .05). However, participants with
UCR or UCI scales earned significantly fewer lottery tickets when given incentives
favoring accuracy (p < .05). The results therefore suggest that the UCR and UCI scaling
limited the extent to which participants were able to adapt their decision strategies to
improve decision accuracy.
Insert Table 3 about here
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Insert Figure 4 about here
Incentives had little effect on measures of choice processes other than decision time.
There were no differences in the direction of search, the variability of information
searched, or the time spent on attributes due to incentives. Participants given
incentives favoring speed therefore appeared to execute the same strategies faster,
rather than to use different strategies, compared to participants given accuracy
incentives. This differs somewhat from the results of Creyer et al. (1990), who found
that subjects given an incentive favoring accuracy used more alternative-oriented
processing, had lower variability in information searched, and spent more time on
important attributes than those given incentives favoring speed.
Mediation of Scaling by Search Direction. If our claim is correct that scaling exerts its
influence by changing the relative effort of within-attribute versus within-alternative
operations, then the direction of search should mediate the effects of scaling.
Establishing the presence of mediation requires that three conditions be met: (1) the
scaling manipulation significantly affects the direction of search, (2) the direction of
search is correlated with decision time (accuracy), and (3) the effect of scaling on
decision time (accuracy) is reduced or eliminated when controlling for the direction of
search (see Baron and Kenney, 1986). Table 2 illustrates that condition 1 is met: the
scaling manipulation does affect the direction of search (F(2,204) = 104.6, p < .01). Both
time and accuracy are correlated with direction of search (time: r = .18, p = .01; accuracy:
r = .22, p < .01), fulfilling condition 2. To evaluate condition 3, we computed the partial
correlations of speed and accuracy with scaling, controlling for direction of search, and
compared them to the corresponding unconditional correlations (see rows 1 and 2 of
Table 4). When controlling for the direction of search, the correlation between scaling
and accuracy was unaffected, but the correlation between scaling and decision time was
reduced (although not eliminated). Thus, it appears that in this experiment the
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direction of search partially mediates the effect of scaling on decision time, but not the
effect of scaling on accuracy.
Insert Table 4 about here
•
However, further analysis shows that the weak mediation results obtain primarily
as the result of the UCI condition. With this condition removed the correlation of
scaling with accuracy is substantially reduced and the correlation of scaling with
decision time is no longer significant (see rows 3 and 4 of Table 4). Thus, omitting the
UCI condition, the direction of search fully mediates the effect of scaling on decision
time, and partially mediates the effect of scaling on accuracy.
Why was the UCI condition different? The UCI scales were neither common nor
relevant to the problem domain, which apparently made them difficult to use.
Consistent with this observation, there were larger variances in decision time and
direction of search in the UCI than in the other conditions. Similarly, the correlation
between decision time and accuracy was significant and positive for both the UCR (r =
.29, p < .01) and CCI conditions (r = .37, p < .01), but was not significant for the UCI
condition (r = .08, p > .05). At the same time, UCI participants made decisions as
quickly as the CCI participants and were as accurate as the UCR participants (Table 2),
consistent with the fact that UCI scales differ from the CCI in commonality and the
UCR in context-relevance. The results therefore suggest that, while the UCI scaling
effectively operationalized the conceptual dimensions of commonality and context-
relevance, it may have produced a condition in which participants found it difficult to
adapt their decision processes to the task.
Discussion: Experiment 1
The results of Experiment 1 show that attribute scaling can affect both the speed and
accuracy of choices, even in the presence of explicit economic incentives for
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performance. Further, the results support our contention regarding the effects of
commonality and context-relevance. The commonality of scaling primarily affected
decision accuracy, while context-relevance primarily affected decision speed. Thus, it
seems prudent for designers of decision research or information displays to give serious
attention to the cognitive incentives implicit in attribute scales, as well as to economic
incentives.
The higher choice accuracy we observed in the CCI condition may have resulted
from the facilitation of the alternative-oriented processing that many normative
strategies require. The fact that participants in the CCI condition took 35% longer to
decide and made decisions that were 8% more accurate than those in the UCR condition
is consistent with such an explanation (cf. Russo and Dosher, 1983). However, the lack
of an effect of incentives on search direction or choice accuracy implies that when
participants did use alternative-oriented strategies, it was more a reaction to cognitive
effort considerations induced by the type of scaling than to a conscious effort to
improve accuracy.
Experience teaches people how to gauge their effort, since effort feedback is
immediate and clear. However, it is often much more difficult to gauge accuracy, since
accuracy feedback is rarely both timely and unambiguous (Einhorn, 1980). Even with
timely, unambiguous feedback, performance does not necessarily improve (Brehmer,
1980). Since we found no difference in accuracy or choice processes across incentive
conditions, we conclude that our participants didn't know how to improve their
accuracy in this task. Consistent with this interpretation, participants given greater
incentives for accuracy found the task more difficult than those given greater incentives
for speed (F(2, 204) = 8.2, p < .01).
On the other hand, our participants were able to adjust the amount of time spent
making choices according to the incentives offered, using significantly less time to make
their choices when given incentives favoring speed. When given incentives for speed,
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participants appeared to execute similar decision strategies faster, rather than to shift
strategies, that is, to work faster but not smarter (cf. Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1988).
Thus, the fact that participants earned more lottery tickets when the goal was to choose
quickly resulted from participants' ability to manage the amount of time used, rather
than from improving their choice accuracy.
Experiment 2
While we infer that the use of more normatively appropriate strategies may have
led to the difference between UCR and CCI in accuracy, why was UCR faster? Two
distinct mechanisms might explain this effect. Context-relevant scaling may: (1)
facilitate access to existing knowledge and/ or (2) cause shifts to less effortful attribute-
oriented strategies. If the speed advantage of UCR scaling results from decision
makers' familiarity with context-relevant attribute scales, then the difference between
UCR and CCI should be greater for familiar than for unfamiliar contexts. On the other
hand, familiarity may have nothing to do with this result. Instead, the greater speed
could result solely from participants using less effortful attribute-oriented heuristics
such as elimination by aspects when presented with UCR scales, in contrast to the more
effortful alternative-oriented strategies they use with CCI scales. Experiment 2 was
designed to (1) replicate the scaling, incentive, and mediation results of Experiment 1,
and (2) gain insight into whether familiarity, shifts in strategy, or some combination of
these factors might account for the faster decision time we found with context-relevant
scaling.
Method
One hundred and eighty-six undergraduate students participated for class credit
and the chance to win 1 of 10 $20 prizes in a lottery. The UCR and CCI scaling
conditions were identical to those in Experiment 1, but the UCI condition was dropped.
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Otherwise, except for adding the familiarity manipulation, all procedures, materials,
and analyses were identical to those in Experiment 1.
We developed two new case scenarios for the choice problems, one that would be
familiar to our participants and another that would be unfamiliar. The familiar problem
was to choose a college for a high school student. The unfamiliar problem was to
choose the best vat of whiskey to purchase from a wholesale distillery in Yugoslavia.
The attributes for the college choice problem were developed based upon guidebooks
for choosing colleges (e.g., Barron's Profiles ofAmerican Colleges, (College Division of
Barron's Educational Service, 1990)) and conversations with students regarding their
actual choice criteria. Attributes chosen for the college choice problem included the
average SAT scores for the incoming class, student/ faculty ratio, distance from home in
miles, cost of tuition in dollars, college size in number of students, and the percentage
of faculty with Ph.D.s. The attributes for the Yugoslavian distillery problem were
developed based on the suggestions of distillery industry professionals (Brown and
Foreman Co., 1991). Attributes for the Yugoslavian distillery problem included the
yield of whiskey per vat in hectoliters, the clarity measured in candles (using a
spectrophotometer), the bacteria count per gram of yeast, the alcohol content as
measured by the "proof of the whiskey, the amount of water in milliliters per liter,
and the temperature at distillation in degrees centigrade. Pretesting with a sample from
the same population as our participants showed these two problems to differ
significantly in familiarity.4
Results
Effects of Scaling. All results related to the effects of scaling were replicated with the
two new problem domains (see Table 5). Participants again made faster choices with
UCR scales, but more accurate choices with CCI scales. As in Experiment 1, search was
more within-alternatives with CCI, more within-attributes with UCR. UCR participants
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again spent more time examining information on the two most important attributes
(F(l, 177) = 10.3, p < .01) and less on the two attributes of moderate importance (F(l,
177) = 18.6, p < .01) than CCI participants. Also consistent with the equivalent
conditions in Experiment 1, there were no differences in the variability in time spent on
attributes (F(l, 177) = 1.4, p = .24) or alternatives (F(l, 177) = 1.5, p = .22), or in the
perceived difficulty of making choices (F(l, 177) = 0.2, p = .68) due to scaling.
Insert Table 5 about here
Effects of Incentives. Like the scaling results, the effects of incentives also replicate
those in Experiment 1 (see Table 6). Participants given incentives favoring speed again
performed the task more quickly, earned more lottery tickets, and found the task easier
(F(l,177) = 4.3, p = .04) than those given incentives favoring accuracy. Also as in
Experiment 1, providing incentives for accuracy did not improve choice quality or
change the direction of search. A scaling by incentives interaction on the number of
lottery tickets earned was again present (F(l,177) = 19.1, p < .01). Participants in the
CCI scaling condition again earned approximately the same number of lottery tickets
regardless of incentives, while participants in the UCR scaling condition earned fewer
tickets when given incentives favoring accuracy (Tukey HSD test, p < .05). Also
consistent with Experiment 1, there were no differences in the direction of search, the
variability of information searched, or the time spent on attributes due to incentives.
Insert Table 6 about here
Effects of Familiarity. Familiarity did not affect decision time, choice accuracy, or the
number of lottery tickets earned (Table 7), nor were there any scaling by familiarity
interactions. There were also no differences in the variability of information searched,
the time spent on attributes, or the perceived difficulty of making choices due to
familiarity. Thus, the hypothesis that familiarity moderates the effects of scaling was
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not supported. Consistent with previous research demonstrating that familiarity
increases the use of alternative-based search (Bettman and Kakkar, 1977; Bettman and
Park, 1980; Johnson and Russo, 1984), participants choosing in the familiar case scenario
searched more by alternatives than those in the unfamiliar scenario. However, this
effect was small relative to the effects of scaling on direction of search.
Insert Table 7 about here
Mediation of Scaling by Search Direction. The mediation results from Experiment 1
(with the UCI condition removed) were replicated. Table 5 illustrates that condition 1 is
met: the scaling manipulation does affect the direction of search (F(l,177) = 323.1, p <
.01). Both time and accuracy are correlated with direction of search (time: r = .39, p <
.01; accuracy: r = .52, p < .01), fulfilling condition 2. For condition 3, the correlation
between scaling and accuracy was dramatically reduced but remains significant, while
the correlation between scaling and decision time was no longer significant (see rows 5
and 6 of Table 4). Thus, in Experiment 2 the direction of search fully mediates the effect
of scaling on decision time, and partially mediates the effect of scaling on accuracy.
Discussion: Experiment 2
Experiment 2 replicated all of the major results of Experiment 1 with different
problem contexts and participants. However, familiarity failed to moderate the effects
of attribute scaling. Thus, we conclude that the greater speed of choices with UCR
scales is due to participants using less effortful attribute-oriented strategies rather than
from increased ease of accessing knowledge in memory.
General Discussion
The principle of description invariance suggests that the decisions we make should
not be influenced by minor variations in problem representation. However, our results
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provide further evidence against the descriptive validity of this principle, by
demonstrating that the scales used to represent attributes can lead to systematic
differences in choices and choice processes. More specifically, we find that the scales
used to present attributes can influence both the speed and accuracy of decision
making, despite the presence of explicit economic incentives. Our results show that
unique, context-relevant scales make for faster decisions, while common, context-
independent scales make for better decisions. These experiments support our view that
scaling operates by influencing the relative effort required by alternative- versus
attribute-oriented cognitive processes. These cognitive incentives for different
processes, induced by scaling, then influence the selection of decision strategies.
One concern about our experiments is that participants in different scaling
conditions may have differed in their interpretation of the optimal attribute weighting
scheme.5 For example, some participants may have interpreted the attribute weights
provided in the experimental instructions as literal regression weights, while others
may have inferred that relative importance weights were intended (see Goldstein and
Beattie, 1991). Different interpretations of the weights across scaling conditions could
produce accuracy differences that would be confounded with the manipulation.
Specifically, it could be the case that participants in the CCI condition made more
accurate choices because they better understood that the attribute weights were
intended as relative importance weights. To investigate this possibility, we ran another
group of 66 subjects, 33 each in the CCI and UCR scaling conditions of Experiment 1.
We asked these subjects to report the optimal weighting of the attributes after
completing their choices. There were no significant differences due to scaling condition
in these ex post self-reported weights (Wilks 1 Lambda = 0.96, F(6, 59) = 0.55, p = .70; p >
.20 for all individual attributes). Further, there were no significant diferences between
any of the self-reported weights and the optimal weights given in the instructions (also
p > .20 for all attributes). While these results do not ensure that they participants used
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the weights appropriately, they do suggest that subjects did not differentially
understand the weights by scaling condition.
Implications for Research
This is the first study to examine how the relationship among attribute scales affects
decision making and to demonstrate how scaling affects processes and performance in
multiattribute choice. It is consistent with a small but growing literature which shows
that ease of processing considerations can account for the influence of information
displays on decision making. More generally, information display is just one of many
characteristics of the task environment that define the cognitive incentive system that a
decision maker faces. This cognitive incentive system determines the relative cognitive
costs and benefits of alternative decision strategies (Payne et al., 1993).
The fact that our participants appeared not to know how to improve their accuracy
is consistent with the idea that effort may be the most influential consideration in
cognitive cost-benefit calculations (see Kleinmuntz and Schkade, in press; Payne et al.,
1993). If people don't know how to assess the accuracy of their decisions, they may
evaluate potential strategies based upon criteria they can more easily assess. The
anticipated effort of a strategy may be easier to assess than accuracy since decision
makers regularly receive process feedback about the cognitive effort required by the
decision strategies they choose (Johnson and Payne, 1985).
In addition to showing that attribute scaling is an important feature of the task
environment, our results raise other issues for decision research. In this study, a
simple, single-screen attribute scaling manipulation (UCR to CCI) resulted in a huge
effect on the direction of search, nearly as large as effects found in previous studies
involving information on separate sheets of paper (e.g., Bettman and Kakkar, 1977;
Bettman and Zins, 1979; Jarvenpaa, 1989). The results therefore provide additional
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evidence of the extreme sensitivity of decision processes to seemingly minor changes in
problem representation.
Previous research has identified many factors other than scaling that influence the
direction of search (e.g., display format, product knowledge, number of alternatives and
attributes). However, given that the majority of previous multiattribute choice research
used UCR scales, it may be necessary to reinterpret some previous findings in light of
this study. For example, Billings and Scherer (1988) compared the decision strategies
used in comparable judgment and choice tasks, using UCR scales. They found
evidence that choice tasks led to more within-attribute search than judgment tasks
(search index of .03 for choice tasks, .40 for judgment tasks). However, using the
estimated effect size for search direction of .73 from our experiments, had they used
CCI scales, they would have obtained a search index of .76 for choice tasks, which could
potentially have reversed their conclusion regarding the direction of search effects in
judgment and choice. Similarly, previous research suggests that decision makers
switch to attribute-oriented heuristics to reduce cognitive load (cf. Russo and Dosher,
1983). This may result from the use of UCR scaling, however, instead of a generalized
tendency to reduce cognitive effort through attribute-oriented processing.
The extent to which the dimensions of commonality and context-relevance
adequately characterize scales remains an open issue. While the definitions of these
dimensions seem to imply that they are conceptually separate, we had difficulty
creating scales described by certain combinations, such as common, context-relevant.
Similarly, the lack of effects due to familiarity in Experiment 2 may result from our
research participants not having sufficient knowledge of and experience with choosing
a college to have benefited from context-relevant scaling. While our results are
generally encouraging regarding the relevance of commonality and context-relevance to
understanding differences in scaling, the conceptual dimensions of scales we have
identified will undoubtedly benefit from insights provided by future research.
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Attribute Scales as Decision Aids
Our results suggest that the design of attribute scaling can be used as decision aids
by designers of information displays. Designers interested in inducing more
normatively correct alternative-based strategies should adopt common attribute scales,
such as those sometimes used in many product evaluation reports (e.g., Consumer
Reports, DataPro Reports on Microcomputers). Alternatively, for relatively unimportant
decisions (e.g., choosing milk at the grocery store) context-relevant scales may reduce
the time required by decisions (e.g., price in dollars, percentage of fat in volume). While
our results suggest that context-relevant scales decrease accuracy, for decisions where
(1) the variance in the quality of outcomes is small, or (2) avoiding a very bad choice
instead of making the best one is the primary evaluative criterion, then context-relevant
scales could speed decision making without substantially decreasing the utility of
outcomes.
Alternatively, designers of information displays (e.g., advertisers) may be more
interested in inducing strategy changes that achieve specific objectives, rather than
assuring that decision makers optimize their own utility. For example, if using
common context-independent scales encourages choice of the best product or service,
then context-independent scaling may induce choice of a superior but less well-known
alternative, instead of better known but poorer quality alternatives. Consider
advertising designed by the maker of a lesser known product (e.g., Quattro Pro
spreadsheet software) that provides "yes/no" comparisons of the features of a better
known product (e.g., Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet software) with the designer's apparently
superior, but less well-known product. Such displays are seemingly designed to induce
purchase of the lesser known but superior product, by inducing within-alternative
product comparisons (e.g., "a total of eight 'yeses' for Quattro Pro versus only two
'yeses' for Lotus 1-2-3"). Of course, the alternative possibility also exists: by using
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context-relevant scales, an information display designer could conceivably encourage
choice of the designer's inferior product or service instead of a competitor's superior
alternative. For example, by highlighting attributes that are thought to be particularly
important (e.g., brand name, price), an information display may encourage attribute-
based processing that considers only those attributes favorable to the information
display designer's product. Manufacturers of name brand products whose advertising
emphasizes brand names (e.g., Levi's 501 jeans) over product features, and discount
stores that advertise exclusively based upon price may use information displays to
encourage information processing based upon the attributes believed to favor the
advertiser.
Conclusion
While this study is only a first step in providing well-grounded advice to the
designers and users of information displays, it suggests that variations in the task
environment faced by decision makers can have real economic consequences. In our
study, decision quality, as well as participants' actual payoffs, were subject to subtle
manipulation through scaling. While it is always possible that higher incentives would
neutralize the influence of scaling, it is more likely that increasing incentives would
cause participants to work harder, but not smarter (cf. Hogarth et al., 1991; McGraw,
1978). Our experiments show that, in the presence of at least modest economic
incentives, the impact of the cognitive incentives due to scaling is of practical as well as
statistical significance. Designers of choice studies and information displays are
therefore advised to exercise care in choosing attribute scales.
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Footnotes
1 While it would be desirable to also have a common, context-relevant condition
to complete the set of theoretical possibilities, we were unable to identify a realistic
context in which all attributes could be naturally expressed on the same scale. We
therefore did not include this type of scale in our studies.
^Scaling representations are linear transformations of one another. For example,
the unique, context-relevant "cost of software" attribute values are obtained by: Y =
$87,000 - 6,000 (X), where X = Common, context-independent value, Y = Unique,
context-relevant value.
3 Other measures of cognitive effort (e.g., percentage of information searched,
total number of boxes opened, number of boxes opened more than once) produce
equivalent results to those reported for decision time.
4 We asked 91 students to rate their familiarity with, and, confidence in
answering questions about, each of the case scenarios. Ratings were made on a scale
from 1 (totally unfamiliar or unconfident) to 7 (totally familiar or confident). The
college choice case received ratings of 5.5 and 5.2 for familiarity and confidence,
respectively, while the Yugoslavian distillery case received ratings of 2.4 and 3.6,
respectively. Both differences are highly significant (F =118.41, p < .01 for familiarity, F
=40.5, p < .01 for confidence).
5 We thank Jane Beattie and an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this insight.
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Table 1
Three Levels of Attribute Scaling: Experiment 1
Attribute
Critical text processing
features
Cost of software
Ease of use
"Wait" time
Learning time
Number of printers
replaced.
Unique, Context Common, Context Unique, Context
Relevant (UCR) Independent (CCI) Independent (UCI)
Condition Condition Condition
1-10 features
$27,000 - $81,000
13 to 58 keystrokes
21 to 120 seconds
12 to 48 hours
5 to 68 printers
1-10 rating
1-10 rating
1-10 rating
1-10 rating
1-10 rating
1-10 rating
-5 to +5 rating
1 to 10 rating
-50 to +50 rating
-10 to +10 rating
1 to 100 rating
-25 to +25 rating
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Table 2
Scaling Effects: Experiment 1
Decision Time (seconds)
Rank of Chosen Alternative (8=best)
Lottery Tickets Earned
Dir. of Search (+ = alt, - = att)
SCALING CONDITION
UCR CCI UCI
b
46.7
6.0
b
26.3
-.37
62.9
6.5
26.8
.38
70.1
5.8
25.0
.09
F(2,204) £
12.4 < .01
27.2 < .01
13.5 < .01
104.6 < .01
Entries within a row with the same letter are not significantly different according to a Tukey
honestly significant difference (HSD) post-hoc comparison test (/? < .05).
Table 3
Incentive Effects: Experiment 1
INCENTIVE CONDITION
Speed>Acc Acc>Speed
Decision Time (seconds) 53.9
Rank of Chosen Alternative (8=best) 6.0
Lottery Tickets Earned
Dir. of Search (+ - alt, - = att)
27.0
.07
65.9
6.1
25.0
.06
F(l,204)
9.5
0.3
49.5
0.1
<.01
ns
<.01
ns
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Table 4
Mediation of Scaling Effects by Direction of Search
Experiment 1 (accuracy)
Experiment 1 (time)
Experiment 1, no UCI (accuracy)
Experiment 1, no UCI (time)
Experiment 2 (accuracy)
Experiment 2 (time)
Correlation w/ Scaling
Correlation Controlling for
with Scaling Direction of Search
.59 .59***
.•29
***
.24**
.31*** .23**
.25**
.03
.53 .22**
.24 .14
p<.05
p<.01
p < .001
Attribute Scales and Choice
39
Table 5
Scaling Effects: Experiment 2
Decision Time (seconds)
Rank of Chosen Alternative (8=best) 6.1
Lottery Tickets Earned
Dir. of Search (+ - alt, - = att)
SCALING CONDITION
UCR CCI F(l,l 77) E
63.3 78.2 10.9 <.01
) 6.9 70.9 <.01
25.8 26.7 9.6 <.01
-.24 .47 323.1 <.01
Table 6
Incentive Effects: Experiment 2
Decision Time (seconds)
Rank of Chosen Alternative (8=best) 6.5
Lottery Tickets Earned
Dir. of Search (+ - ait, - = att)
NCENTIVE ! CONDITION
Speed>Acc Acc>Speed Fd.l 77) E
66.2 75.6 4.3 .04
6.5 0.3 ns
26.6 26.0 4.8 .03
.11 .12 0.0 ns
Attribute Scales and Choice
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Table 7
Familiarity Effects: Experiment 2
FAMILIARITY CONDITION
Familiar Unfamiliar ¥(1,177) £
Decision Time (seconds) 74.9 67.2 2.5 ns
Rank of Chosen Alternative (8=best) 6.5 6.5 0.0 ns
Lottery Tickets Earned 26.1 26.4 1.2 ns
Dir. of Search (+ = alt, - = att) .18 .05 11.0 < .01
Figure 1 — Example of UCR Scaling (from Morochove, 1992)
Figure 2 — Example of CCI Scaling (from Morochove, 1992)
Figure 3 — Mouselab Choice Display with an "Opened" Cell
Figure 4 — Scaling by Incentives Interaction: Experiment 1
Accounting Made Easy
M. Y.O.B. combines a rich set offeatures with ease ofuse, while QuickBooks wins the prizefor sheer simplicity.
• Yes Limited only by
O No
<i Deficient
A Unlimited
available disk space
or memory
0/0 = not applicable
Standard features
%\ Y6 ^9
>1S
List price $129
Local area network support
Setting up books
Number of start-up charts of accounts 8 7 ^^Jd H 1 3 1 21 13
Maximum number of fiscal periods in a year 13 365 13 12 13 12 12 13
Optional cash basis accounting •
a O ^•^ •* O • • •
Tracking revenues
Service and support
Maximum number of customers T 324MO 4E2 sooo T >IOOO T
Customer-specific payment terms • o X*3 • • • •
Customizable invoice/customer statement O/O O/O jjgjL3_3Vo_ O/O •/• O/O o5/o •/•
Recurring invoices • O ' :-Td: • • • •
Auto-computes finance charges • • j&3 • • o O
Overdue aging categories 4 3 IS 3 3 4 3
Age-dependent dunning notices o o • o O
Managing expenditures
Maximum number of vendors T 31000 5000 T >1000 T
Vendor-specific payment terms • O i£*3 • • o •
Customizes check, payment advice formats O O S#3 o • o •
Recurring payments • o SC3 o • • •
Auto-computes prompt-payment discount • o £•: • • o •
Holds payment of disputed amounts • o • • o
Cash requirements report • • ^•2 o • • •
Financial recording
Maximum number of ledger accounts 5000 JtiV*h'i 500 T >2000 T
Maximum number of open fiscal periods 13 365 MEM I* 26 26
Maximum number of departments (digits) 16 ggGC : 9 2
Maintains budget data • o • • •
Financial reporting '
Statement of changes in financial position O o sates o • o •
Customizes financial statements • o W8CI3 : • • •
Graphical display of financial position o o \MM3L 3 o o O
Check reconciliation with bank account • o f«S7| • • • O'
Exports to spreadsheet • • X%Z3 y • • o'
Password protection level module
l0
module module
11
nwfiu module system company fTwnti
Sales analysis by customer/product/territory •/•/O | •/O/O "•/•/•^ •/CIO •/•/O •/•/O | •/•/O •/•/O •/•/O
Free support/toll-free support line O/O ©>K> *ff*s 30dorVO O/O' ©"/• 30doyvC' A/O 30dayj/O'
Daily support (hours) 9 10 SO ' 12 9 9 U 1
1
~
Extra-cost option.
May work on net under some circumstances.
Using Checkbook.
In Master module only.
Service, inventory, and professional invoice formats.
Does not maintain budget for penod 13.
All have balance sheet and income statement.
In upcoming release.
Included in Accounting Works.
Various privileges for modules you have <
Eoch menu assigned one of nine unchangeable
security levels.
Limned to two calls.
Accounting for the Rest of Us
An easy-to-use, robust accounting solution, M.Y.O.B. has all the answersfor the small business.
Some of these accounting packages excel in
ease of use, particularly QuickBooks 1 .0
and Accpac Simply Accounting 1 .0L;
others sport a broad array of features. But
one stands out from the competition by com-
bining a unique, easy-to-follow design with a comprehen-
sive set of features: M.Y.O.B. 3.0. In addition, Peachtree
Accounting for Windows 5.0 and Pacioli 2000 2.0
deserve mention for their good range of features.
Key Buying Issues: Percentage of Importance:
Eos* of ua 35%
Financial recording 10%
Financial reporting 1 0%
Manoging
expenditures 10%
Service and support 10%
Setting up books 1 0%
Tracking revenues 1 0%
Price 5%
Excellent
Good ^Wrtr
Fair
Poor *
Overall value is calculated by multiplying each category rating by the category's weight percentage, summing the results, and rounding to the nearest half number.
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